This Report addresses the unanswered questions relating to the intelligence on the 7/7 bombers, particularly those arising out of the investigation of the 2004 fertiliser bomb (CREVICE) plot.
This Report considers whether the UK security and intelligence Agencies had any knowledge of, and/or involvement in, rendition operations, and also the Agencies' overall policy for intelligence sharing with foreign liaison services.
This Report examines intelligence and security matters relevant to the July terrorist attacks, focusing in particular on: whether any intelligence which may have helped prevent the attacks was missed or overlooked; why the threat level to the UK was lowered prior to the attacks and what impact this had; and what lessons were learned from these attacks, and how these lessons are being applied.
This report covers the contact between detainees and the SIS, Security Service, both military and civilian DIS staff and military intelligence personnel in Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay and Iraq.
This report examines whether the available intelligence, which informed the decision to invade Iraq, was adequate and properly assessed and whether it was accurately reflected in Government publications.
This report examines the threat assessment system and its application, whether Indonesia was a sufficiently high intelligence priority, and whether the travel advice provided by the FCO accurately communicated the assessed threat.
This report examines the policies and procedures adopted by the Security and Intelligence Agencies for the handling of information supplied by Mr Mitrokhin.
The report investigates claims made of British intelligence involvement in the events which led to the restoration of the Kabbah government in Sierra Leone.